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1 About reflexion 
One of the fundamental properties of human existence is that, along with the natural 
(‘objective’) reality, there exist its images in human minds. A purposeful study of this 
phenomenon is traditionally associated with the term ‘reflexion’. The term reflexion 
(from Latin reflex ‘bent back’; was first suggested by J. Locke) means [1]: 
 a principle of human thinking, guiding humans towards comprehension and 
perception of one’s own forms and premises; 
 subjective consideration of a knowledge, critical analysis of its content and 
cognition methods; 
 the activity of self-actualization, revealing the internal structure and specifics of 
spiritual world of a human. 
Consider the situation with one subject. He has beliefs about the natural reality, 
but he can also realize these beliefs (construct beliefs about beliefs), etc. This is how the 
reflexive reality is formed. The subject's reflexion on his own beliefs about reality, the 
principles of his activity, etc. is called self-reflexion or a reflexion of the first kind. 
Reflexion of the second kind takes place in the situation of several subjects who know 
about the existence of each other and consists of beliefs about reality, the principles of 
decision-making, self-reflexion, etc. other subjects. 
Since reflexion is a fundamental property of human, it is necessary to take it into 
account in the sciences studying the activity of a person and society, including the 
control sciences, in which human (people) acts as the object of control or a part of it. At 
the same time, we can assume that reflexion is present in such models in some aspects 
by default, if human (people) is modeled in them as an active element and / or control is 
present (see [2]). Methodological approaches to the correlation of reflexion and control 
in terms of the classical input-output control scheme are described in more detail in [2]. 
The aim of this paper is to review the existing approaches to the explicit 
consideration of reflexion in static and dynamic mathematical models of behavior from 
game theory, theory of collective behavior and behavioral economics, i.e., at first, an 
approaches, where reflexion is separate aspect of modeling, at second, an approaches, 
where reflexion can be easily identified by analogy with the first approaches. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes static reflexive models of 
noncooperative game theory. Section 3 provides dynamic models which includes 
reflexion. Some other examples presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes our 
work. 
2 Statics. Noncooperative game theory in normal form 
Game theory, branch of applied mathematics, that analyzes models of decision making 
in the conditions of noncoinciding interests of parties (subjects); each side strives for 
influencing the situation in his/her favor [3,4]. 
Further, to denote the subject making decision, and its decision, the terms agent 
and action are used. The main task of game theory is to describe the interaction of 
several agents whose interests do not coincide, and the results of activities (payofs, 
utility) of each depend in general on the actions of all. The result of such a description is 
the forecast of a reasonable and ‘sustainable’ outcome of the game - the so-called game 
solution (equilibrium). 
The basic description of the game is to set the following parameters: 
 a set of agents N = {1, … , n}; 
 a set of feasible actions of agents: 𝑋𝑖, 𝑋 = 𝑋1 ×…𝑋𝑛. Further it will be 
understood that the sets of actions of agents are finite, unless the contrary is 
specified; 
 preferences of agents (relationships between actions and payoffs). Each agent is 
supposed to strive for maximizing his/her payoff (the behavior of each agent 
appears purposeful): 𝑢𝑖(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)
𝑥𝑖
→𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋𝑖, 𝑢𝑖 is utility function of 
agent i; 
 awareness of agents (information on essential parameters, being available to 
agents at the moment of their choice); 
The above parameters define a game, but they are insufficient to predict its outcome, 
i.e., a solution (or an equilibrium). Nowadays, game theory suggests no universal 
concept of equilibria. By adopting different assumptions regarding principles of agent’s 
decision making, one can construct different solutions. Thus, design an equilibrium 
concept forms a basic problem for any game-theoretic research. 
In game theory, psychology, distributed systems and other fields of science (see 
the overviews in [5,6]) , one should consider not only agents’ beliefs about essential 
parameters, but also their beliefs about the beliefs of other agents, etc. The set of such 
beliefs is called the hierarchy of beliefs. We will model it using the tree of awareness 
structure of a reflexive game (see below). In other words, situations of interactive 
decision making (modeled in game theory) require that each agent ‘forecasts’ 
opponents’ behavior prior to his/her choice. And so, each agent should possess definite 
beliefs about the view of the game by his/her opponents. On the other hand, opponents 
should do the same. Consequently, the uncertainty regarding the game to-be-played 
generates an infinite hierarchy of beliefs of game participants. 
A special case of awareness concerns common knowledge when beliefs of all 
orders coincide (see [2] for a survey). In [7] was introduced a rigorous definition of 
common knowledge as a fact with the following properties: 
(1) All agents know it; 
(2) All agents know 1; 
(3) All agents know 2 and so on – ad infinitum. 
As surveyed in [2], there are two ‘extremes’ in the awareness of agents: 
 The first ‘extreme’ is common knowledge; 
 The second ‘extreme’ is the infinite hierarchy of compatible or incompatible 
beliefs given in [8]. On the one hand, it describes all possible Bayesian games 
and all possible hierarchies of beliefs. On the other hand, it appears very general 
and, consequently, very cumbersome, thus interfering with constructive 
statement and solution of specific problems. 
Reflexive game is defined as a game in which agents make decisions based on the 
hierarchy of their beliefs. The dependence of game solutions on a finite hierarchy of 
compatible or incompatible beliefs of agents (the whole range between the above 
‘extremes’) has been studied in [9,1]. 
According to game theory and reflexive models of decision making, it seems 
reasonable to distinguish between informational reflexion and strategic reflexion. 
Informational reflexion is the process and result of agent’s thinking about (a) the values 
of uncertain parameters and (b) what his/her opponents (other agents) know about these 
values. Here the ‘game’ component actually disappears–an agent makes no decisions. 
Strategic reflexion is the process and result of agent’s thinking about which decision 
making principles his/her opponents employ under the awareness assigned by him/her 
via informational reflexion. Therefore, informational reflexion often relates to 
insufficient mutual awareness, and its result serves for strategic reflexion and then for 
decision making. Strategic reflexion takes place even in the case of complete awareness, 
precessing agent’s choice of an action. It allows to eliminate the uncertainty about the 
behavior of opponents. In other words, informational and strategic reflexion can be 
studied independently, but the both occur in the case of incomplete or insufficient 
awareness. 
Let's move on to a description of informational reflexion model. 
2.1 Informational reflexion 
Consider the set of agents: 𝑁 = {1,2, … , 𝑛}. Denote by 𝜃 ∈ Θ the uncertain parameter 
(let's the set Θ is a common knowledge for all agents) from which (in addition to 
actions) the agents utility function depends. The awareness structure 𝐼𝑖 of agent 𝑖 
includes the following elements. First, the belief of agent 𝑖 about the parameter 𝜃; 
denote it by 𝜃𝑖 ∈ Θ. Second, the beliefs of agent 𝑖 about the beliefs of the other agents 
about the parameter  ; denote them by 𝜃𝑖𝑗 ∈ Θ, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁. Third, the beliefs of agent 𝑖 about 
the beliefs of agent 𝑗 about the belief of agent 𝑘; denote them by 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑘 ∈ Θ, 𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑁. And 
so on (evidently, this reasoning is generally infinite). 
In the sequel, we employ the term ‘awareness structure’, which is a synonym of 
‘informational structure’ and ‘hierarchy of beliefs’. Therefore, the awareness structure 𝐼𝑖 
of agent 𝑖 is specified by the set of values 𝜃𝑖𝑗1…𝑗𝑙 ∈ Θ, where 𝑙 runs over the set of 
nonnegative integer numbers, 𝑗1, … , 𝑗𝑙 ∈ 𝑁. 
The awareness structure 𝐼 of the whole game is defined in a similar manner; in 
particular, the set of the values 𝜃𝑖1…𝑖𝑙 ∈ Θ, with 𝑙 running over the set of nonnegative 
integer numbers, 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑙 ∈ 𝑁. We emphasize that the agents are not aware of the whole 
structure 𝐼; each of them knows only a substructure 𝐼𝑖. 
Thus, an awareness structure is an infinite n-tree (each non-leaf node has n 
descendants); the corresponding nodes of the tree describe specific awareness of real 
and phantom (see below) agents. 
A reflexive game Г𝐼 is a game defined by the following tuple: 
 Г𝐼 = {𝑁, (𝑋𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 , 𝑢𝑖()𝑖∈𝑁 , 𝐼}  
Therefore, a reflexive game generalizes the notion of a normal-form game (determined 
by the tuple {𝑁, (𝑋𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 , 𝑢𝑖()𝑖∈𝑁}) to the case when agents’ awareness is presented by 
an hierarchy of their beliefs (i.e., the awareness structure 𝐼). Within the framework of 
the accepted definition, a ‘classical’ normal-form game is a special case of a reflexive 
game (a game under a common knowledge among the agents). Consider the ‘extreme’ 
case when the state of nature appears a common knowledge; for a reflexive game, the 
solution concept (based on an informational equilibrium, see below) turns out 
equivalent to the Nash equilibrium concept. 
To proceed and formulate a series of definitions and properties, we introduce the 
following notation: 
 Σ+ – stands for a set of finite sequences of indexes from 𝑁; 
 Σ is the Σ+ with empty sequence appended; 
 |𝜎| – indicates the number of indexes in the sequence 𝜎 ∈ Σ (for the empty 
sequence, it equals zero); this parameter is known as the length of an index 
sequence. 
Imagine 𝜃𝑖 represents the belief of agent i about the uncertain parameter, while 𝜃𝑖𝑖 
means the belief of agent 𝑖 about his/her own belief. It seems then natural that 𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖. 
In other words, agent 𝑖 is well-informed on his/her own beliefs. Moreover, he/she 
assumes that the rest agents possess the same property. Formally, this means that the 
axiom of self-awareness is accepted: ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀ 𝜏, 𝜎 ∈ Σ: 𝜃𝜏𝑖𝑖𝜎 = 𝜃𝜏𝑖𝜎. 
In addition to the awareness structures 𝐼𝑖(𝑖 ∈ 𝑁), one may also analyze the 
awareness structures 𝐼𝑖𝑗 (i.e., the awareness of agent 𝑗 according to the belief of agent 𝑖), 
𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑘, and so on. Let us identify the awareness structure with the agent being 
characterized by it. In this case, one may claim that 𝑛 real agents (𝑖-agents, where 𝑖 ∈
𝑁) having the awareness structures 𝐼𝑖 also play with phantom agents (𝜏-agents, where 
𝜏 ∈ Σ+, |𝜏| ≥ 2) having the awareness structures 𝐼𝜏 = {𝜃𝜏𝜎}, 𝜎 ∈ Σ. It should be 
emphasized that phantom agents exist merely in the minds of real agents; still, they have 
an impact on their actions; these aspects will be explained below. 
Assume that the awareness structure 𝐼 of a game is given; this means that the 
awareness structures are also defined for all (real and phantom) agents. Within the 
framework of the hypothesis of rational behavior, the choice of an action 𝑥𝜏 performed 
by a 𝜏-agent is described by his/her awareness structure 𝐼𝜏. Hence, the mentioned 
structure being available, one may model agent’s reasoning and evaluate his/her action. 
On the other hand, while choosing his/her action, the agent models actions of the rest 
agents (i.e., performs reflexion). Therefore, estimating the game outcome, we should 
account for the actions of real and phantom agents. 
A set of actions 𝑥𝜏
∗, 𝜏 ∈ Σ+, is called an informational equilibrium, if the 
following conditions are met: 
(1) The awareness structure 𝐼 possesses finite complexity [10]; 
(2) ∀𝜆, 𝜇 ∈ Σ+ 𝐼𝜆 = 𝐼𝜇 ⇒ 𝑥𝜆
∗ = 𝑥𝜇
∗; 
(3) ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝜎 ∈ Σ: 𝑥𝜎𝑖
∗ ∈ Argmax
𝑥𝑖∈𝑋𝑖
𝑢𝑖(𝜃𝜎𝑖 , 𝑥𝜎𝑖1
∗ , … , 𝑥𝜎𝑖(𝑖−1)
∗ , 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝜎𝑖(𝑖+1)
∗ , … , 𝑥𝜎𝑖𝑛
∗ ). 
Here Condition 1 claims that a reflexive game involves a finite number of real and 
phantom agents (what happens when this assumption is rejected, is discussed in [11]). 
Condition 2 expresses the requirement that the agents with an identical awareness 
choose identical actions. Finally, Condition 3 expresses rational behavior of agents–
each agent strives for maximizing the individual goal function via a proper choice of 
his/her action. For this, an agent substitutes actions of the opponents into his/her goal 
function; the actions are rational in the view of the considered agent (according to the 
available beliefs about the rest agents). 
2.2 Strategic reflexion 
Publications on strategic reflexion models (strategic thinking in English-speaking 
environment), the so-called level-k models, appeared in the mid-1990s [12,13,14]. The 
basic idea is that an agent can assume (when making a decision) that all other agents act 
uniformly randomly, then his best response will correspond to the maximization of the 
mathematical expectation of his utility function. Such an agent has rank 1 of reflexion, 
agents acting randomly – rank 0. Another agent may think that this type of beliefs will 
be for everyone, i.e. the other agents have 1 rank, and not 0, then its action maximizes 
his utility function, provided that the others act as agents of rank 1. Such an agent has 
rank 2. It is easy to construct an agent of arbitrary rank 𝑘. 
In 2002, a generalization arose - a model of cognitive hierarchies (the Cognitive 
Hierarchies Model - CH) [15,16] , in which the distribution of agents’ ranks of reflexion 
is according to the Poisson distribution and an agent with rank 𝑘 thinks that other agents 
have not only rank (𝑘 − 1) but some ‘truncated’ or normalized Poisson distribution of 
0, 1, … , (𝑘 − 1) ranks. Further in 2016, the authors constructed a generalized model of 
cognitive hierarchies [17], in which two free parameters were introduced into the 
model. 
In parallel with this, the quantum best response (QBR) model developed [18], 
the idea of which is that people make mistakes the more often, the less these mistakes 
cost. 
Stahl и Whilson [14] combined the level-k and QBR models: in the level-k 
model, players use QBR instead of the best response. In [19] the same idea was used, 
only CH was taken instead of the level-k model, which gave an effect - the QCH model 
more effectively describes the behavior of people in experiments. Further, work [200] 
shows that a small shift of the Poisson distribution underlying CH is also fruitful, the 
proposed Spike-Poisson QCH model (QCH with shifted Poisson distribution) has 
shown greater efficiency. 
In fact, all these models have the four common components, variations of which 
cause their difference: 
(1) Partitions of agents to the ranks of reflexion; 
(2) Awareness of agent with rank 𝑘; 
(3) The rank 𝑘 agent’s response model to expected actions of opponents  
(4) Behavior model of rank 0 agent. 
Partitions of agents to the ranks of reflexion model. Let’s define ℵ = {𝑁0, … , 𝑁𝑚} – 
the set of agents 𝑁 partitions to reflexion ranks, where 𝑁𝑖 – the set of rank 𝑖 agents,  
𝑖 = 0, … ,𝑚 – maximum reflexion rank. Let 𝑛𝑖 = |𝑁𝑖|, ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑚0 = 𝑛. Partition ℵ is called 
a reflexive partition [21]. We also introduce the notation 𝑓𝑘 = 𝑛𝑘/𝑛, then 𝑓0, … , 𝑓𝑚 
can be called a distribution of ranks. 
In the level-k model, it is usually assumed that 𝑚 = 2, and the reflexive 
partitioning (three parameters 𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, of which two are free) are searched based on 
the criterion of the maximum descriptive power of the model on real data. 
In the (generalized) model of Cognitive Hierarchies, 𝑚 is not limited or not 
greater than 7, and the distribution of ranks is the Poisson distribution with one 
parameter. 
Awareness of agent with rank k is how he constructs his subjective reflexive 
partitioning of the set of agents. The general assumption among the models of strategic 
reflexion is that the agent of rank 𝑘 does not allow the existence of agents having the 
same or higher rank of reflexion (although the agent may think that there are agents of 
the same rank, but this is not always appropriate for various reasons, see Section 2.5 in 
[16]). Then his belief about reflexive partition will differ from the real ℵ. 
For agent 𝑗 of rank 𝑘 the subjective reflexive partition is: 
 ℵ𝑗
𝑘 = (𝑁𝑘0, 𝑁𝑘1, … , 𝑁𝑘(𝑘−1), {𝑗}, ∅, … , ∅),  
where 𝑁𝑘𝑙 –set of agents of rank 𝑙 in beliefs of agent of rank 𝑘. 
In the level-k model 
 𝑁𝑘(𝑘−1) = 𝑁\{𝑗}, 𝑁𝑘𝑝 = ∅, ∀𝑝 = 0,… , 𝑘 − 2  
In the Cognitive Hierarchies model 
 𝑓𝑘𝑝 =
𝑓𝑝
∑ 𝑓𝑙𝑘−1𝑙=0
  
And it is assumed that 𝑁𝑝 ⊂ 𝑁𝑘𝑝. 
In the generalized cognitive hierarchy model 
 𝑓𝑘𝑝 =
(𝑓𝑝)𝛼
∑ (𝑓𝑙)
𝛼𝑘−1
𝑙=0
, 𝛼 ≥ 1  
In the reflexive partitions method example from [22]: 
 𝑁𝑘(𝑘−1) = 𝑁𝑘−1 ∪ 𝑁𝑘\{𝑗} ∪ 𝑁𝑘+1 ∪ …∪ 𝑁𝑚 , 𝑘 ≥ 1  
 𝑁𝑘𝑝 = 𝑁𝑝, 𝑝 < 𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 ≥ 2  
The rank 𝒌 agent’s response model to expected actions of opponents – with the 
given representations of opponents, the agent knows his action and can choose his 
action focusing on the utility function - choose the best answer or the ‘quantum’ best 
answer. 
Let 𝑠𝑗
𝑘 – a mixed strategy of agent 𝑗 of rank 𝑘. Let rank 0 agent choose a mixed 
strategy with equal probabilities for all actions 𝑠𝑗
0 = 𝑠𝑈, so that 
 ∀𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝑋𝑗: 𝑠𝑗
0(𝑎𝑗) = 1/|𝑋𝑗|.  
Definition. Let’s define 𝑢𝑗(𝑎𝑖, 𝑠−𝑗) – expected utiltity of 𝑗-th agent when playing action 
𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝑋𝑖 against opponents’ strategy profile 𝑠−𝑗. Then a quantal best response 
𝑄𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑠−𝑖 ; 𝜆) by agent i to 𝑠−𝑖 is a mixed strategy 𝑠𝑖 such that 
 𝑠𝑖(𝑎𝑖) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆·𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖,𝑠−𝑖)]
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆·𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖
′,𝑠−𝑖)]𝑎𝑖
′
,  
where 𝜆 (the precision) represents agents’ sensitivity to utility differences. 
Most papers use such either best response or QBR model of response to 
expected actions: 
 𝑟𝑗(𝑠−𝑗) ≝ {
U(Argmax
𝑎∈𝑋𝑖
(𝑢𝑗(𝑎, 𝑠−𝑗))), 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
𝑄𝐵𝑅𝑗(𝑠−𝑗, 𝜆), 𝑖𝑓 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
,  
where 𝑈(𝐴) – mixed strategy with equal probabilities for elements of 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑋. 
Then for agent of rank 1: 
 𝑠𝑗
1 = 𝑟(𝑠−𝑗
𝑈 ).  
For an agent of rank 𝑘: 
 𝑠𝑗
𝑘(ℵ𝑗
𝑘) = 𝑟𝑗 ((𝑠𝑁𝑘0
0 , … , 𝑠𝑁𝑘(𝑘−1)
𝑘−1 ))  
Behavior model of rank 0 agent. In most works, it is assumed that an agent of rank 0 
makes a uniform random choice between his actions. Such a model has the merit in that 
it is defined for any set of actions and sufficiently general. However, to describe the 
behavior of real people it is not always successful. For example, in [22] it was suggested 
to change the model of players of rank 0 that “dramatically improve predictions of 
human behavior, since a substantial fraction of agents may play rank-0 strategies 
directly, and furthermore since iterative models ground all higher-level strategies in 
responses to the rank-0 strategy” [22,p.1]. 
Variants of behavior of the 0 rank agent used in other works: 
 maximin (pessimistic model), maximax (optimistic), minimax regret, fairness 
and efficiency in [22]; 
 averse to receiving minimum payoffs in [17]; 
 iterated dominance [23]. 
The reflexive structure is determined by a combination of the first two components of 
the approaches, and if an awareness model of an rank 𝑘 agent is given, then the 
reflexive structure is uniquely determined by the reflexive partition ℵ. Note that the 
reflexive structure considered within the framework of the models of strategic reflexion 
is in a sense similar to the information structure used in the models of information 
reflexion. 
Agents’ strategy profile 
 𝑠∗(ℵ) = {𝑠𝑗
𝑘(ℵ𝑗
𝑘)}
𝑗∈𝑁𝑘,𝑘=0..𝑚
  
are called reflexive equilibrium of the game Γℵ = {𝑁, 𝑢𝑖()𝑖∈𝑁 , ℵ} [21,24].  
Without using the quantal best response, a reflexive equilibrium is usually 
possible to formulate in pure strategies. Reflexive equilibrium is the aggregate of 
actions of agents, which are the best answers to the actions of opponents assumed 
within bounds of the existing reflexive structure. Note that the reflexive equilibrium is 
quite exotic in the sense that in it the actions of agents in the general case are not the 
best responses to the actions chosen by opponents and it always exists by construction. 
A systematic classification of strategic reflexion models is given in [21, 24]. 
2.3 Combined model of information and strategic reflexion 
Information and strategic reflexion models are similar, so the idea of combining them 
appeared and proposed in [25]. Such combined model is formulated for case of small 
number of agents, when beliefs of each can be clearly expressed. 
Beliefs of an agent can be represented as an oriented tree whose nodes are 
agents, real or phantom (i.e. existing only in the mind of other agents). An arrow from 
agent A to agent B would mean that agent B knows all information about agent A 
(hereinafter, we will call a real or phantom agent just an ‘agent’, unless the opposite is 
stated).  
Such a tree of agent 1, as an example, for 𝑛 = 3, is shown on Fig. 1. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
On the diagram, node ‘1’ is a real agent 1, nodes ‘12’ (’one-two’, not twelve) and ‘13’ 
are agents 2 and 3 in beliefs of agent 1.  
Note that nodes ‘12’ and ‘13’ are ‘hanging’, i.e. that phantom agents 12 and 13 
do not have beliefs about opponents. This fact means that such agents have rank 0. As 
stated above the rank of an agent is one greater than the largest rank that his opponents 
have, in his opinion. So agent 1 on Fig. 1 has rank 1. 
If agent 1 thinks that his opponents have rank 1, for example, then he has rank 2. 
Similarly, if agent 1 thinks that his opponents 2 and 3 have ranks 0 and 1, then he also 
has rank 2. Graphs for these cases are shown on Fig. 2(a) and 2(b). 
[Figure 2(a) and 2(b) near here] 
Thus, the rank of an agent equals to the number of arrows in maximal length path from 
leaf nodes to the agent (equals 0 if he is a leaf node of a tree - there are no incoming 
arrows). So agents of rank 2 and more must have beliefs about beliefs of their 
opponents and so on (these are agents 121, 123 etc. on Fig. 2). 
For a complete description of a situation we need to define beliefs of all agents 
which creates a hierarchic information structure. An example of such a structure is 
given in Fig. 3. 
[Figure 3 near here] 
We can merge some agents as they have equal beliefs and, consequently, equal actions. 
For example, 1212 and 132 on Fig. 3 are phantom agents 2 with rank 0 who act 
identically, so we can merge them in one node. In other words, agents 121 and 13 have 
equal beliefs about agent 2. Furthermore, if we identify in this way all rank 0 agents, we 
can see that agents 12 and 2 have equal beliefs about agent 3 with rank 1. 
After completing all merging operations, we get a more visually attractive graph 
of agents’ beliefs, the graph of a reflexive game [1], where each node represents a real 
or a phantom agent (Fig. 4). 
[Figure 4 near here] 
As we can see, the graph of a reflexive game displays the following information: 
 ranks of agents; 
 adequate or inadeqate beliefs: agent 1 is adequately informed about agent 3 (i.e. 
the image of agent 3 in mind of agent 1 matches with real agent 3), but he is not 
adequately informed about the agent 2. 
 equivalent beliefs: agents 3 and 12 have the same beliefs about the agent 1 
(though incorrect). 
Further, the information reflexion to the existing hierarchic beliefs structure is added. 
Let 𝜃 ∈ Θ be the external system parameter on which agents’ utility functions are 
dependent on: 𝑢𝑖: Θ × 𝑋 → ℝ. The second assumption is that agents’ have common 
knowledge that the parameter value is not known exactly – each agent can estimate it 
differently. In other words agent 𝑖 have belief about 𝜃: 𝜃𝑖 ∈ Θ. 
Now, to predict agent 𝑗 action an agent 𝑖 must have an opinion about opponent’s 
beliefs about the value of 𝜃: 𝜃𝑖𝑗 ∈ Θ and his beliefs about his opponents beliefs and so 
on. We can put simple information reflexion model to our example case (Fig. 4). Let all 
agents believe that 𝜃 = 𝑎 ∈ Θ. Then it can be displayed as the same graph as in Fig. 4 – 
equal beliefs of all are not shown by convention. Here 𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = 𝜃3 = 𝜃12 = 𝜃23 =
𝜃31 = 𝜃21 = 𝜃32 = 𝜃313 = 𝑎. 
Let all agents believe that 𝜃 = 𝑎 but agent 23 believes that 𝜃 = 𝑏 ≠ 𝑎. Now we 
cannot merge agents 23 and 123 since they have different beliefs (equal strategic but 
different information reflexion), and so they will be represented by different nodes in 
the graph of a reflexive game (opposite to the situation in Fig. 4). This is shown on 
Fig. 5 (here, beliefs of most agents 𝜃 = 𝑎 are not shown). Now agents 2 and 12 have 
different beliefs about agent 3. Despite the fact that agent 23 thinks that 𝜃 = 𝑏, he 
believes that his opponents (agents 21 and 32) think that 𝜃 = 𝑎. 
[Figure 5 near here] 
It is clear that this way we can specify an arbitrary beliefs structure about the parameter 
𝜃, i.e. such a structure in which all agents have definite beliefs about 𝜃 and about the 
opponents’ beliefs about 𝜃 and so on, see [1]. The resulting model is a combination of 
the information reflexion model and the strategic reflexion model. 
3 Dynamics. Collective behavior models, learning and teaching models 
The simplest model in moving from a static situation to a dynamic one is a repeated 
game of 𝑛 agents, in which: 
(1) A fixed number of decision-making stages 𝑡 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝑇}, 
(2) At each stage, each agent 𝑖 chooses his action 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) ∈ 𝑋𝑖, 
(3) Each stage has its own result – payoff of each agent 𝑢𝑖(𝑥1(𝑡), … , 𝑥𝑛(𝑡)) ∈ ℝ, 
(4) An agent’s payoff in each stage does not depend on the stage (time) and the 
history (sequence of actions), but only on the current stage actions: 𝑢𝑖: 𝑋 → ℝ, 
(5) An agent’s overall payoff is a total payoff in each stage. 
Static models can be considered as a starting point for dynamics of agents - such models 
that allow you to select the action in the first stage of a repeated game. In spite of 
condition 4, a rational player can take into account history of actions to identify 
opponents behavior. 
In this chapter, we first consider the collective behavior approach, in which the 
behavior of a group of agents is studied, built on the local boundedly rational behavior 
of agents of the group, at each stage tending to maximize utility functions. Then 
learning models, where each agent is trying to find the optimal mixed strategy by 
learning from received payoffs and/or game history. Then we will mention models with 
reflexion – teaching models - if the agent knows that the others are learned, then he can 
use it to teach them profitable for himself strategies. 
3.1 Collective behavior models 
Traditionally, in game-theoretic models and/or in models of collective decision-making, 
one of two assumptions about mutual awareness of agents is used [24]. Either it is 
believed that all the essential information and the principles of decision-making by 
agents are known to all, everyone knows that everyone knows this, etc. to infinity. In 
other words the concept of common knowledge is used. Either it is assumed that each 
agent, within the bounds of his awareness, follows a certain procedure for making 
individual decisions and almost ‘does not think’ about what they know and how the 
other agents behave. The first approach is canonical for game theory, the second - for 
models of collective behavior, and also partly for learning models. But between these 
two ‘extremes’ there is a rather large variety of possible situations. Suppose that an 
agent in situation of common knowledge of significant external parameters (no 
information reflexion) carried out an act of strategic reflexion - he tried to predict the 
behavior (not only awareness, but also the principles of decision making) of other 
agents and chooses his actions with this forecast (such an agent has the first rank of 
reflexion). Another agent (having a second rank of reflexion) may know about the 
existence of agents of the first rank and predict their behavior. And so on. 
Classic game-theoretic models proceed from the following. In a normal form 
game, agents choose Nash equilibrium actions. However, investigations in the field of 
experimental economics indicate this not always the case (e.g., see [26] and the 
overview [27]). The divergence between actual behavior and theoretical expectations 
has several explanations: 
 limited cognitive capabilities of agents [28] (evaluation of a Nash equilibrium 
represents a cumbersome computational problem [29], especially decentralized). 
It should also be emphasized that the Nash equilibrium does not always 
adequately describe the real behavior of agents in laboratory experimental one-
step games, including because agents do not have time to ‘correct’ their 
misconceptions about the essential parameters of game. For example, the 
concept of D. Bernheim's rationalized strategies requires unlimited rationality of 
agents [30]; 
 agent’s full confidence in that all the opponents would evaluate a Nash 
equilibrium; 
 incomplete awareness; 
 the presence of several equilibria. 
Therefore, there exist at least two foundations (‘theoretical’ and ‘experimental’ ones) 
for considering models of collective behavior of agents with different reflexion ranks. 
In contrast to game theory, the theory of collective behavior analyzes the 
behavior dynamics of rational agents under rather weak assumptions regarding their 
awareness. For instance, far from always agents need a common knowledge about the 
set of agents, sets of feasible actions and goal functions of opponents. Alternatively, 
agents may not predict the behavior of their opponents (as in game theory). Moreover, 
making decisions, agents may know nothing about the existence of some agents or 
possess aggregated information about them. 
The most widespread model of collective behavior dynamics is the model of 
indicator behavior (see references in [24]). The essence of the model consists in the 
following. Suppose that at stage t each agent observes the actions of all agents 
{𝑥𝑖(𝑡 − 1)}𝑖∈𝑁, that have been chosen at the previous stage 𝑡– 1, 𝑡 = 1,2, … The initial 
action vector 𝑥(0) = (𝑥1(0),… , 𝑥𝑛(0)) is assumed known. 
Each agent can evaluate his/her current goal – an action maximizing his/her 
utility function provided that at a current stage all agents will not change actions from 
the previous stage (either action giving maximum is unique or we have a formal 
procedure to choose one of that): 
 𝑤𝑖(𝑥−𝑖(𝑡 − 1)) = argmax
𝑦∈𝑋𝑖
𝑢𝑖(𝑦, 𝑥−𝑖(𝑡 − 1)) , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑡 = 1,2, …. (1) 
According to the hypothesis of indicator behavior, at each game stage an agent makes a 
‘step’ from his/her previous action to the current goal: 
 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑥𝑖(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛾𝑖
𝑡(𝑤𝑖(𝑥−𝑖(𝑡 − 1) + 𝑥𝑖(𝑡 − 1)), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑡 = 1,2, …, (2) 
where 𝛾𝑖
𝑡 ∈ [0,1] designate ‘step size’. 
It can be seen that expression (2) implies that the sets of actions of agents are 
vector spaces. This emphasizes the fact that models of collective behavior usually 
consider the movements of agents on a plane or in space. On the other hand, if the sets 
of actions are finite, the hypothesis of indicator behavior can be reformulated where 
mixed strategies of players are used as actions. Such a model will be to some learning 
models (see below). 
For convenience, such collective behavior can be conditionally called 
‘optimization behavior’, thereby emphasizing its difference from game behavior. The 
approaches of the theory of collective behavior and game theory are consistent in the 
sense that both investigate the behavior of rational agents, and game equilibria, as a 
rule, are equilibria of the dynamic procedures of collective behavior (for example, the 
Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium of the dynamics (2) of collective behavior). 
To make the picture complete, note one more aspect, as well. The theory of 
collective behavior proposes another approach (going beyond the scope of this work), 
namely, evolutionary game theory [31]. This science studies the behavior of large 
homogeneous groups (populations) of individuals in typical repeated conflicts; each 
strategy is applied by a set of players, whereas a corresponding utility function 
characterizes the success of specific strategies (instead of specific participants of such 
interaction). 
Thus, game theory often employs maximal assumptions regarding agents’ 
awareness (e.g., the common knowledge hypothesis), while the theory of collective 
behavior involves the minimal assumptions. The addition of reflexion allows us to 
create an intermediate model, as was done in [22] using strategic reflexion, namely: 
within the hypothesis of indicator behavior (2), it is implicitly assumed that an agent, 
when choosing his actions, does not think about the fact that other agents act same. If he 
thought about it (carried out the reflexion), then at the time t he should have sought the 
best response to the actions of other agents predicted by expression (2). Thus, the 
position of the goal would no longer be determined by the expression (1), but by the 
expression 𝑤𝑖(𝑥−𝑖(𝑡)), where 𝑥−𝑖(𝑡) is determined by the expression (2). 
In this case, it can be assumed that the reflexing agent of the first rank considers 
all others as non-reflexive. Analogously, we can consider agents of higher reflexion 
ranks too. For their description we use the reflexive partitions of a set of agents 𝑁: ℵ =
{𝑁0, … , 𝑁𝑚} (see the strategic reflexion section above for formal description). 
We will assume further that the agent with reflexion rank 𝑘 reliably knows the 
sets of agents of all lower ranks 𝑘′ (where 𝑘′ < 𝑘 − 1) and considers all agents of his 
and higher ranks (𝑘′′ 𝑘) having rank one less than itself (that is, rank 𝑘 − 1). 
Let the vector 𝑥(0) of the ‘initial’ actions of agents be given. Consider the 
following dynamic model of the reflexive decision making. 
Rank 0 of reflexion. We will assume that agents with zero rank of reflexion 
(belonging to the set 𝑁0) assume that the actions of the remaining agents will be the 
same as in the previous time: 
 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑥𝑖(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛾𝑖
𝑡[𝑤𝑖(𝑥−𝑖
𝑡−1) − 𝑥𝑖
𝑡−1], 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁0, 𝑡 = 1,2, … (3) 
Rank 1 of reflexion. Agent 𝑗, who has the first rank of reflexion (𝑗 ∈ 𝑁1), 
considers all other agents to have zero-rank reflexion and, in accordance with (3), 
‘predicts’ their choice. Therefore, his own choice 𝑥𝑗
1(𝑡) will be focused on the best 
response to the situation, which from his point of view should arise: 
 𝑥𝑗
1(𝑡) = 𝑥𝑗
1(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛾𝑗
𝑡[𝑤𝑖(𝑥−𝑖(𝑡)) − 𝑥𝑗
1(𝑡 − 1)], 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁1  
For the agent 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁1, the forecasted trajectory is defined by 
(𝑥(0), . . . , (𝑥𝑗
1(𝑡), 𝑥−𝑗(𝑡)), . . . ). The realized trajectory may not coincide with the 
trajectories predicted by agents of various degrees of reflexion [1]. 
Rank 2 of reflexion. We will assume that each agent 𝑗 having the second rank of 
reflexion (𝑗 ∈ 𝑁2) knows the set 𝑁0 reliably and considers all agents from the set 
𝑁\𝑁0 \ {𝑗} possessing the first rank of reflexion. Because of this, he can ‘predict’ the 
behavior of all his opponents and his choice will be: 
 𝑥𝑗
2(𝑡) = 𝑥𝑗
2(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛾𝑗
𝑡 [𝑤𝑖 (𝑥𝑁0(𝑡), 𝑥𝑁1∪𝑁2{𝑗}
1 (𝑡)) − 𝑥𝑗
2(𝑡 − 1)] , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁2  
For agent 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁2 the forecasted trajectory is defined by 
 (𝑥(0),… , (𝑥𝑗
2(𝑡), 𝑥𝑁0(𝑡), 𝑥𝑁1∪𝑁2\{𝑗}
1 (𝑡)),… )  
Rank k of reflexion (𝑘 ≤ 𝑚). The behavior of rank 𝑘 agents is described 
similarly to the three cases (zero, first and second ranks of reflexion) considered above, 
taking into account the following reflexive structure of agents. Let ℵ𝑗
𝑘 be the subjective 
reflexive partition – beliefs of rank 𝑘 agent 𝑗 about reflexive partitions of all agents: 
 ℵ𝑗
𝑘 = (𝑁0, 𝑁1, … , 𝑁𝑘−2, 𝑁𝑘−1 ∪ 𝑁𝑘 ∪ …∪ 𝑁𝑚\{𝑗}⏟                            
𝑘
, {𝑗}, ∅, … , ∅⏟    
𝑚−𝑘−1
), 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑘  
Rank 𝑘 agent 𝑗 will choose an action in accordance with expression 
 𝑥𝑗
𝑘(𝑡) = 𝑥𝑗
𝑘(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛾𝑗
𝑡 [𝑤𝑖(𝑥𝑁0(𝑡), 𝑥𝑁1
1 (𝑡),… , 𝑥
𝑁𝑘−1∪…∪𝑁𝑚\{𝑗}
𝑘−1 (𝑡)) − 𝑥𝑗
𝑘(𝑡 − 1)]  
3.2 Learning and teaching models 
In the basic formulation of the learning model, they rely on the idea of learning with 
reinforcement: the agent selects the action at each stage of the game and receives the 
result - a gain. The idea is that the agent should strive to choose those actions that led to 
big gains. Wherein game setting is absent, there is only an agent and an ‘environment’ 
(static or dynamically changing), acting in which the agent receives his gains. 
Nevertheless, experimental game theory successfully uses learning models to describe 
the behavior of players in games. Such models are called reinforcement-based models. 
Such models ‘grown up’ in the field of individual decision making [32] and psychology, 
see [33]. 
In parallel, there is a ‘game’ formulation of learning models - players are not 
looking at their gains, but on the actions chosen by opponents (of course, if it is 
observable information case). That is, at each stage, using the history of actions of 
opponents, the agent builds, in general, a simple (statistical) model of the behavior of 
opponents and chooses an action that maximizes his utility function for a given behavior 
of opponents. Such models are called belief-based models, they have developed in the 
theory of games. 
One can say that the first formulation does not use reflexion, and the latter 
explicitly introduces the agent's reflexion into the model - the decision-making model of 
opponents. It seems that these two models have nothing in common - they are based 
entirely on different principles and different information, but work of Camerer and Ho 
[34] showed that they have much in common. They proposed a model of learning, 
particular cases of which are models of one and the other side (also a short review on 
this topic was made). 
Historically, one of the first belief-based models was the Cournot model [35], in 
which it was assumed that by choosing his action at the next stage, the player believes 
that opponents will not change their actions and choose the best response to the actions 
of opponents in the previous stage (like an indicator behavior with move size equal to 
1). That is a simple model of response to a dynamically changing situation. 
The next widely known model is the fictitious play model [36,37] (Fictitious 
Play, FP). Here the player forms a model of the behavior of opponents as a random 
variable with an empirical distribution function, observing their actions in the previous 
stages. Then the best response is chosen - the action that brings the maximum expected 
gain for the given behavior of the opponent. This model is based on the idea of learning, 
although it remains some ‘static’ in the understanding of opponents - using the 
empirical distribution function implies that the opponent does not change his behavior. 
In addition to the above models, models in [38,39,40] also belong to this class, 
which are various generalizations of the Cournot and FP to overcome their weaknesses. 
In the reinforcement-based models, the player does not need to know any 
information about the other players. Under sufficient assumptions, knowing only his 
gains from the game history allows them to correct next-stage action and find the 
optimal strategy, at least in asymptotic by stages. Models of this class presented in 
[33,41]. 
In [34] a hybrid EWA model (experience weighted attractions) with six free 
parameters was constructed. The values of the parameters under which the model is 
identical to reinforcement- and belief-based models are shown. A discussion of the 
qualitative value of the free parameters of the model is proposed. In [42] fixed values 
for three model parameters and functional dependencies that determine the values of 
two free parameters from the game's history are proposed. Thus, the number of free 
parameters is reduced to one as a response to criticism of a large number of free 
variables of the EWA model. It is shown, however, that such a model can well describe 
existing data of human behavior. 
Finally, one of the recent models - the Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) 
model [43] - is proposed for a case of continuum cardinality set of actions. In it, the 
choice is also made from discrete set of actions, at each stage the elements of it can be 
replaced with a given probability by an element from the initial continuum set of player 
actions. The accumulation of the value of "reinforcements" occurs in a different way: 
selecting two arbitrary actions, duplicating a more successful action, and removing a 
less successful one. That is why the model has in its name the word ‘evolutionary’. 
In the Sophistication model [44,45] reflexion was added in a manner similar to 
reflexion in the indicator behavior model (see above), namely: the reflexive agent 
believes that opponents use the learning model for decision making. Based on this 
model, he predicts their behavior at the next stage and chooses best response action. 
This is an agent of rank 1 reflexion. There is also a feature of the proposed model - 
players of the same rank know about each other and must choose the Nash or quantal 
response equilibrium. Agents of higher ranks are built in the same way as models of 
strategic reflexion. 
In the same works ([44,45]) the teaching model are proposed. The agent believes 
that his opponents use the learning models and uses it not only to predict their actions, 
but also to choose a farsighted strategy of teaching opponents. 
4 Examples 
4.1 Dynamic of information awareness 
A model describing the dynamics of agent awareness was considered in [46] on the 
basis of the following situation: three friends play a game in which the third pick two 
integers (possibly coincident) between 1 and 9 inclusive and reports sum of these 
numbers to the first, and their product to the second. Then the third one asks: ‘what 
numbers are picked?’. The first and second should call these numbers or answer ‘I do 
not know’, they respond simultaneously and do not exchange any information, but they 
know history of answers. Both answered the same question: ‘I do not know’. The third 
repeated the question: ‘what numbers are picked’? The first and second, having thought, 
again answered: ‘I do not know’. The third repeated the question and received the same 
answer. So it was repeated seven times, and on the eighth the first player named the 
numbers. 
It turns out (see [46]) that a complete description of the awareness of the first 
and second players (including, in addition to the two real ones, 25 phantom agents) 
allows one to determine which numbers were picked and how the awareness changed 
after each answer. 
4.2 The diffuse bomb problem 
In work [47] so-called ‘the diffuse bomb problem’ are considered: 
 The goal of a group consisting of several moving objects (agents) moving on a 
plane is a search (defeat) of a fixed target; 
 The time to reach the goal is not fixed; 
 There are several fixed sensors; 
 When a sensor detects an agent, there is a risk of agent destruction increasing 
with decreasing distance between them; 
 Agents move with a constant absolute value of a given speed, the direction of 
motion can vary; 
 Planning of agent trajectories is carried out decentralized (autonomously) in real 
time. 
The effeciency criterion of the actions of the group is their number 𝐾 that have 
reached the goal. Reflexive models are introduced in the formulation, where the risk of 
detection also increase with decreasing distance among agents, hence the behavior 
forecasts of the opponents is important. 
The first reflexive behavior model is introduced similarly to the reflexion in the 
indicator model: reflex agents predict the action of the other agents in the next stage and 
take this into account when calculating the detection risk. In accordance with the 
introduced notation, this is a model of strategic reflexion, and only agents of rank 0 
(non-reflexive) and 1 are introduced. Simulation experiments have shown that the 
efficiency of a group with proportion of rank 1 agents is increased, though not much. 
While the survival of reflexive agents (rank 1) is also higher than non-reflexive (rank 0). 
The second reflexive behavior model is introduced in a situation where some 
agents do not know the level of risk. Those agents who know the level of risk, let's call 
them ‘scouts’, go to the goal first. Agents who do not know the level of risk (adaptive) 
observe the movement of the scouts and, knowing their behavior principles, build an 
empirical level of risk that they use for their own movement. Simulation experiments 
have shown that in this particular case, 20% of scouts (agents with large capabilities) 
are sufficient to ensure that the effectiveness of the group does not fall much compared 
to the situation when all agents are scouts. This model can be referred to as information 
reflexion, since the agents' beliefs about nature and their changes in the development of 
the situation are modeled. 
In [48] the investigation of the diffuse bomb problem continues, but a game-
theoretic component is introduced - two players simultaneously and independently 
choose their actions: one player selects the type of behavior model of agents, the second 
selects the sensors location. It is a matrix game. The Nash equilibrium in the original 
game and in the game of ranks, where players choose their ranks of strategic reflexion 
are considered. In a concrete example, it turned out that unique Nash equilibrium (in 
mixed strategies) does not change in the transition to a game of ranks. But in the game 
of ranks it is easier to find it because dimension of the game is less than the original 
game (not more in general case). 
5 Conclusion 
This review on the use of reflexion in static and dynamic formulations shows, on the 
one hand, the existence of common features of these approaches, on the other hand, the 
different possibilities of using reflexion in models:  
 to analyze, predict and control game theoretic situation; 
 to construct collective behavior; 
 to learn and to teach opponents behavior. 
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Figure 1. An example of a belief tree. 
Figure 2. (a) beliefs of agent 1 that his opponents are rank 1 agents, (b) beliefs of agent 
1 that his opponents has rank 0 and 1. 
Figure 3. All agents’ beliefs example. 
Figure 4. The graph of a reflexive game. 
Figure 5. The graph of a reflexive game with information reflexion. 
 
